Introduction {#Sec1}
============

Cooperation with non-kin is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of human society^[@CR1]--[@CR4]^. A complicated dilemma derives from the fact that defectors gain an obvious advantage over cooperators. According to Darwin's theory of evolution, competition rather than cooperation ought to drive our actions. Thus addressing the subtleties how cooperation emerges and stabilizes in groups continues to intrigue researchers in multidisciplinary fields^[@CR5]--[@CR10]^. Past decades have seen the paradigm of punishment rises as one of the more successful strategies by means of which cooperation might be promoted^[@CR11]--[@CR18]^. Indeed, our societies are home to a plethora of sanctioning institutions. However, punishment is costly, and as such it reduces the payoffs of both the defectors as well as of those that exercise the punishment. Punishers fall victim to the second-order free-riders, who cooperate but do not pay extra cost to punish defectors. As such survival of punishers in the evolution becomes puzzling. Up to now, a number of mechanisms that have been proved successful in explaining the evolution of cooperation are also available in explaining the evolution of punishment, such as the group selection^[@CR19]^ and spatial structure^[@CR20]--[@CR25]^. Other mechanisms supporting punishment include the voluntary participation^[@CR26],[@CR27]^, pool punishment^[@CR28]^, coordinated punishment^[@CR29]^, probabilistic punishment^[@CR30]^. Yet the evolution of altruistic punishment remains an open problem.

Mobility is an essential feature of living organisms. Through migration, individuals free themselves from undesirable circumstances and negative consequences of that situation, in pursuit of more profitable environment^[@CR31]^. Ample theoretical works have demonstrated the significant role migration plays in promoting or affecting the evolution of social cooperation^[@CR32]--[@CR42]^. In the framework of spatial games, by simply introducing a moderate probability of random migration to adjacent sites, cooperation level can be greatly enhanced^[@CR32],[@CR43],[@CR44]^. Additional driving forces for migration as the payoff ^[@CR34],[@CR45]^, aspiration^[@CR46]^, as well as reputation^[@CR38]^, can have diverse effects in elevating cooperation. However, as the second-order cooperator, punisher's mobility is often ignored in previous studies. In fact, one of the key reasons that punishment can not establish in the population lies in its heavy cost when punishers are rare, who punish left and right in a sea of defectors and are quickly wiped out by natural selection. Previous works have shown that when punishment is probabilistic, the burden of punishing can be largely alleviated^[@CR30],[@CR47]^. Nevertheless, when stuck in inferior environment, punishers do not necessarily need to execute this action aiming at modifying behavior (called partner control), but have an alternative choice of leaving^[@CR48]--[@CR50]^, to avoid future exploitation from such partners (called partner choice). The effect of such choice remains to be probed into.

Motivated by this, we here construct a spatial game model, using the typical paradigm of the public goods game (PGG) which exists in all kinds of complex social systems widely, such as the distribution of social welfare, environmental protection, public transportation, civil medical insurance and so on. Individuals are located on the sites of a network and play games with their direct neighbors indicated by the edges they are linked to. After the PGG which is organized in the group centered on each site, each punisher can decide to stay still and punish defectors or to leave but do not punish, judging by the number of defectors encountered in the game interaction. A threshold value is used here to govern the sensitivity of running away. Two scenarios are considered here: one in which punishers are directly faced with defectors, and the other where defectors and cooperators compete for survival in conflict against the same enemy, the defectors. By Monte Carlo simulations, we will show that the level of optimal punisher's mobility is closely related to the cost of punishing. Unless for the negligible cost of punishing, there exists medium tendency of migration which favors the survival of punishers best. This conclusion holds for both the direct competition between punishers and defectors and the case where second-order free-riders are involved, and is also verified when various types of punishers with different mobility tendencies fight against defectors simultaneously.

This article argues for a closer look at the condition where punishers survive when the severeness of punishment can be diluted by alternative choice of running away in harsh situations. More precisely, we aim to identify the optimal conditions of migration tendency such that punishment can be sustained most at an equilibrium. The following is a summary of the rest of the paper. In section Methods we introduce the model. In section Results we present the main results. We make concluding remarks in the section Discussion.

Results {#Sec2}
=======

We start by considering the direct competition between punishers and defectors. Figure [1(a)](#Fig1){ref-type="fig"} shows the fraction of punishers as a function of enhancement factor $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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A detailed revelation of how specific punishment parameters as both the cost $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Previous works have unveiled the fact that different initial distributions of a certain type of individuals in the whole population have significant impact on the final outcome of evolution in spatial games^[@CR53]--[@CR56]^. Hence it is necessary to probe into the different roles of punisher's migration tendency under either adverse circumstances when relative rare or advantageous environment when sufficiently abundant. To this end, we have explored the evolution of punishers under different initial fractions from quite rare (0.001) to relatively abundant (0.5) in the population under cheap punishment (with relatively low cost compared to its effect, which is more commonly observed in reality). Figure [3](#Fig3){ref-type="fig"} shows the critical value of enhancement factor $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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So far we have discussed the impact of the choice between running and punishing on the evolution of punishers when they are confronted with defectors directly. However, as the second-order cooperators, besides the contribution made to the public pool as cooperators do, punishers also pay extra cost to regulate non-cooperators. Therefore it is unclear how defectors can survive when surrounded by cooperators. It is essential to investigate the mobility effect on punishers when cooperators are present, and to explore under what conditions mobility provides punishers with more privileges. Simulations on populations with initially equal percentage of cooperators and punishers show that stationary fractions of C, D, and P prevail at different intervals of enhancement factor $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Up to now, we have investigated the impact of different $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Discussion {#Sec3}
==========

Mobility is the essential feature of living organisms by which individuals leave unfavorable environment and increase the chances of survival. Mobility of individual plays significant role in answering the vital question of how cooperation is evolved when free-riding is apparently more beneficial. Recent advances have paid intensive attention to the role of punishing strategy. Yet as a higher-order cooperator, the emergence and persistence of punishers is still puzzling because punishers are easily taken over by the higher-order free-riders, i.e., the pure cooperators. In explaining the evolution of punishers, the mobility of punishers have long been ignored. To explore the effect of mobility on the survival of punishers, we have constructed a spatial model of public goods game played on square lattices with empty sites. Punishers are endowed with the capability of making the choice between staying still and punishing all defectors, and that of migrating to a neighboring empty site without punishing, with the decision dependent on the maximum number of defectors punishers can tolerate. Through Monte Carlo simulations, we have investigated the evolution of punishers affected by the migration tendency both in a scenario of punishers directly competing with defectors and in the case with cooperators, defectors, and punishers to check the condition under which migration offers more chances for punishers to survive, especially with the second-order free-riders, the cooperators. Furthermore, we have constructed a case where all these different types of punishers initially coexist in the evolution to check which one is most favored by natural selection.
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                \begin{document}$$\theta $$\end{document}$ offers punishers more superiority if cost is large. For the low cost, the advantage of small $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\theta $$\end{document}$ is only observed when $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
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The puzzling of punishment mainly lies in its cost relatively to cooperators, as well as being cooperators who become inferior when faced with defectors who contribute nothing. Hence previous works have proposed models incorporating more realistic traits by which the actual cost can be reduced when they are implemented^[@CR58],[@CR59]^. One direction to explore is how the cost is born. Instances include those where cost are not only undertaken by the punishers, but also by those from higher hierarchies, the third party, or even cooperators^[@CR47],[@CR60]^. Another way to consider is the punishment not always implemented, such as the coordination of punishment or the probabilistic execution^[@CR30],[@CR61]^. Current model considers the migration to avoid the cost. Indeed it also resembles the probabilistic strategy, not designated uniformly but rather dependent on specific environment. Previous literature has reported that in the two-strategy social dilemmas the survival of cooperators is supported by the motion of influential players^[@CR33]^. Similarly, we show that in the multi-player game of PGG with three strategies, overall cooperation can be enhanced if higher-order cooperators, the punishers, are allowed to move away from bad environment with certain probability. We hope this work contribute to further understanding of punisher's survival in the evolutionary competition. And it helps to understand the role mobility plays when population are faced with various environments with differing levels of harshness.
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We consider a population of individuals playing public goods game staged on a $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$L\times L$$\end{document}$ square lattice with periodic boundary conditions, where each site is either empty or occupied by one individual. Empty sites represent possible niches that individuals can migrate to^[@CR32],[@CR62]^. The fraction of populated sites is denoted by the population density $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$k=8$$\end{document}$, the Moore neighborhood). Initially each player is designated as one of the three types: cooperator (C), defector (D), and punisher (P).

In the evolution each elementary step consists of the following two stages. Firstly, a PGG is held. Each cooperator or punisher contributes to the common pool at a cost $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$r$$\end{document}$, and are then equally distributed among all the group members, despite their contributions. Secondly, recognizing the number of defectors in the group, each punisher makes a decision to punish all the defectors or to leave current group. If the number of defectors is no more than the threshold $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\gamma $$\end{document}$ as commonly assumed in previous literatures^[@CR27],[@CR28]^. Otherwise, the punisher leaves current site and migrates to a randomly chosen empty sites in the neighborhood. Thus magnitude of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\theta $$\end{document}$ reflects one's punishment tendency, or inverse migration tendency. Each evolutionary generation is composed of many elementary steps such that on average each individual has organized once the PGG. After that, each individual $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$i$$\end{document}$ updates its strategy synchronously by copying the strategy of a randomly chosen neighbor $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\kappa $$\end{document}$ measures the magnitude of noise to permit irrational choices. Smaller value implies that superior strategies are more favored to be adopted, albeit it is not impossible to employ the suboptimal strategies. In the present work we have designated $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\kappa =0.1$$\end{document}$ which depicts a scenario of strong selection where beneficial strategies are more likely to survive under evolution pressure.

During one full Monte Carlo step (MCS), all individuals in the population receive a chance once on average to adopt another strategy. To avoid the frozen state in which some individual clusters are isolated and thus have no chance of interaction with the rest of the population, a small probability $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\varepsilon =0.01$$\end{document}$ is applied for any individual to migrate randomly to an empty neighboring sites. And we have checked that the influence of this mobility on the final evolution state is negligible. The population density $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\rho $$\end{document}$ may affect the evolution of strategies on networks with empty sites as previously reported^[@CR38],[@CR62]^, yet in current work we mainly focus on the mobility of punishers and assume a fixed population density $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\rho =0.5$$\end{document}$ throughout the paper. Depending on the proximity to phase transition points and the typical size of emerging spatial patterns, the linear system size was varied from *L* = 100 to 400 and the relaxation time was varied from $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$${10}^{4}$$\end{document}$ to $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$${10}^{6}$$\end{document}$ MCS to ensure proper statistical accuracy. The reported fractions of competing strategies were determined in the stationary state when their average values became time-independent. Alternatively, we have averaged the outcomes over 50 to 2000 independent runs when the system terminated into a uniform absorbing state.
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